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DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
HARMONIZING NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, IOWA MUTUAL,
AND THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
LYNN H. SLADE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Which sovereign's court will decide a case is a question that
implicates both power and prerogative. Sovereigns exert power when
their courts decide cases, and, particularly when the parties contest a
government's jurisdiction over a matter, which court system will have
priority may materially affect the balance of power between governments.l But disputants always have cared where they litigate, pursuing
the perceived advantages of a tribunal they hope will see things their way
or that will afford other dispute resolution qualities, including economy,
efficiency, finality, and predictability. To resolve the inevitable issues
over which of two or more courts with jurisdiction will initially decide a
case, a complex, shifting, and often unpredictable set of judicially
created rules has arisen to allocate judicial primacy among the courts of
competing sovereigns. These rules usually are analyzed under the
discipline the law professors call "Federal Jurisdiction." Until recently,
the courts and theoreticians writing in this area, struggling to balance
powers between state and federal courts, largely ignored the tribal
courts.2 Perhaps predictably, when tribal courts arose and proliferated
in the last forty years, the federal courts' allocations of judicial power
between tribal courts and their federal and state competitors often cast
their decisions in notions of federal Indian law, rather than in the
doctrines of federal jurisdiction.
This article addresses the divergence between the doctrine being
developed in allocating judicial power between tribal and federal courts
and the abstention doctrine applied in contests between federal and state
courts. My thesis is that the federal courts' increasing preference for
staying or dismissing their cases in favor of tribal courts reflects a
* Mr. Slade practices law in the Albuquerque office of the New Mexico firm of Modrall,
Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, PA., representing energy developers and other businesses in advice
and litigation concerning natural resources, business development, and environmental compliance on
Native American lands.
1. One may speculate on the significance of this power by imagining how the civil rights
controversies of the 1960s and 1970s would have developed if the cases were required to be litigated
initially in state courts.
2. See generally Judith Resnick, Dependent Sovereign: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 671,675-86 (1989); as Professor Resnick observes, the main treatise in this
area for many years, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, in several of its
editions, barely mentioned the Indian tribes. Id. at 686 n. 62.
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doctrine needing direction. The Supreme Court's seminal decisions in
this area have identified important tribal interests at stake and contain the
kernels of, but have yet to articulate clearly, the pertinent interests of the
other stakeholders and of the dispute resolution system and how those
interests should be reconciled with Indian interests in a federal court's
decision whether to proceed. The result increasingly is a jurisprudence
that mechanically requires abstention or exhaustion, because courts fail
to identify, or undervalue the interests of state and federal governments,
and court systems of the private litigants.
First, this article will examine the foundations of the "Indian
abstention" doctrine being developed in the federal courts. It will
analyze the holdings in National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians3 and Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,4 examine
the linkage between those Supreme Court decisions, and illustrate the
lower court decisions that have applied those decisions to require
abstention in ever-broader categories of cases.5
Second, to determine whether the broader doctrine developing in
the lower courts properly is founded in National Farmers Union and
Iowa Mutual, the article will examine the abstention doctrine principles
the federal courts have developed in contests between federal and state
courts,6 and argue that National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual reflect
applications, respectively, of the abstention doctrines of Younger v.
Harris7 and Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States8
and their progeny. If that analysis is correct, those doctrines imply limits
on the scope of the Indian abstention doctrine that the lower federal
courts have ignored.9
Third, the article seeks to test whether the present application of the
Indian abstention doctrine properly is grounded in other important
principles and policies of Indian law that some courts and writers have
advanced.10 These arguments generally have carried the day with the
federal courts: abstention to allow tribal courts first to address a matter
has been deemed necessary, among other reasons, to the "federal policy
of promoting tribal self-government [that] encompasses the development
3. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
4. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part IlI.
7. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
8. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See, e.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts' JurisdictionalDeterminations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding,and Respect Between Different Culturaland Judicial
Norms, 24 N.M. L. REv. 191 (1994); Frank Pomnersheim, Liberation, Dreams, and Hardwork: An
Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence,1992 Wis. L. REv. 411,412-13 (1992).
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of the entire tribal court system . . .,"l I or to allow tribal courts to
"interpret and apply tribal law."12 I will argue that, while such policies
certainly support deference to tribal courts in many cases, they do not
weigh equally in all cases, and should be balanced appropriately against
other considerations recognized in decisions applying the abstention
doctrine in other contexts.13
Potent solutions have been proposed to the problems posed by the
shift of judicial power to tribal courts, ranging from statutorily defining
the Indian abstention rules1 4 to creating a federal Indian Court of
Appeals.1 5 While I agree that Congress should consider such bold
strokes, my proposal is more modest: federal judges should return to the
abstention doctrines of Younger and Colorado River and apply them as
appropriate in "Indian abstention" cases, giving due regard for
applicable federal Indian policies, to decide whether to abstain or to
proceed to address the difficult issues that current disputes present.
Infusing Indian abstention decisions with Younger and Colorado River
analysis would impart a balance that may counter the inefficiency and
unfairness that often plagues dispute resolution in Indian country. For
this jurisprudence to function effectively, it seems clear the lower courts
need Supreme Court guidance.
II.

THE INDIAN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE

National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutuall6 have altered radically
the balance of judicial power in Indian country.1 7 Both were personal
injury suits filed in tribal court by Native American plaintiffs, and in
both a non-Indian defendant subsequently filed a federal court action to
avoid the tribal court. Both Supreme Court decisions sent the parties
back to tribal court. These two Supreme Court decisions form the

I1.Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 16-17.
12. Id. at 16.
13. See infra Part V.
14. See Raymond Cross, De-FederalizingAmerican Indian Commerce: Toward a New Political
Economy for Indian Country, 16 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Poly 445, 488-89 (1993) (proposing a model for
the deregulation of business transactions); Laurie Reynolds, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies: Extolling
Tribal Sovereignty While Expanding Federal Jurisdiction,73 N.C. L. REv. 1089, 1153-57 (1995)
(proposing United States Supreme Court certiorari review of Tribal court decisions).
15. Michael Pacheco, Finality in Indian Tribunal Decisions:Respecting Our Brothers' Vision, 16
AM. INDLAN L. REV. 119, 153 (1991).
16. National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa Mutual
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
17. I use the term "Indian country" in this article in the non-technical sense, without jurisdictional
implications, heeding Fred Ragsdale's warning that 'Indian country is an incredibly complex
jurisdiction issue disguised in a colorful phrase." Fred L. Ragsdale, "The Deception of Geography," in
American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century 65, 69 (Vine DeLoria. Jr., ed. 1985).
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foundation, however, for ever-widening barriers to federal court review
of far broader classes of cases.
National Farmers Union arose when a member of the Crow Tribe
was injured in a motorcycle collision at a Montana public school on fee
lands within the Crow Reservation. The tribal member sued the county
school district and its insurer in tribal court and obtained a default
judgment.' 8 Rather than move to set aside the default judgment under
an available tribal court procedure,19 the defendant insurer for the school
district sought injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana. The federal district court granted the requested
injunctive relief, finding that the tribal court lacked civil jurisdiction over
the action, 20 and the Ninth Circuit reversed. 2 1
Viewed from the standpoint of non-Indian federal court plaintiffs,
Justice Stephens' opinion in National Farmers Union may appear to
have good news and bad news. Favorably, it concludes that the
contention that an Indian tribe lacks power to subject a non-Indian
property owner to civil jurisdiction of a tribal court "is one that must be
answered by reference to federal law and is a 'federal question' under
[28 U.S.C.] § 1331."22 The bad news for would-be federal court
plaintiffs is that this federal question generally cannot be litigated in
federal court: National Farmers Union concluded that the federal court
should not address this federal question "until after the Tribal Court has
had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction and to rectify
any errors it may have made."23 Although National Farmers Union
provided exceptions to this rule, they are of narrow scope: exhaustion
may not be required when (1) tribal jurisdiction is asserted in bad faith,
(2) tribal jurisdiction violates "express jurisdictional prohibitions," or,
18. 471 U.S. at 847-48.
19. Id. at 856 n.22. The Crow Tribal Court's rules provided for a motion to set aside a default
judgment. Id.
.
20. 660 F. Supp. 213. 217 (D. Mont. 1983) (finding specifically that a tribal court lacked
jurisdiction over non-Indian activities on fee lands within the reservation because the judge found
lacking any of the grounds held necessary to support regulatory jurisdiction in such circumstances by
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,556-57 (1981)).
21. 737 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1984).
22. 471 U.S. at 852. National Farmers Union requires 'exhaustion" of tribal remedies, rather
than that the federal court should "abstain" pending the tribal court's determination of its jurisdiction.
Id. This choice of labels may have little significance given that the Supreme Court has described a
decision to abstain as requiring 'exhaustion of state remedies.' Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452.473
(1974). Professor Skibine has argued, however, that Indian abstention cases should be decided under
principles of administrative law exhaustion. Skibine, supra note 10, at 204.
23. National FarmersUnion, 471 U.S. at 857. On remand, following Supreme Court decision in
National Farmers Union, the Crow Tribal Court denied the insurer's motion to dismiss, finding
jurisdiction under the Montana test, and the Crow Tribal Court affirmed. Sage v. Lodge Grass School
Dist., Civ. No. 82-287 (Crow Trib. Ct. Sept. 12, 1985); see Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond,
Montana Tribal Courts: Influencing the Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV.
211, 250-51 (1991) (discussing implementation of the tribal court exhaustion requirement).
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(3) where exhaustion would be futile for lack of an adequate tribal court
24
opportunity to challenge jurisdiction.
Iowa Mutual reached a similar result in a diversity case where the
federal court plaintiff tried a bit harder in the tribal system. In Iowa
Mutual, a member of the Blackfeet Indian Tribe who was injured in an
accident on a ranch on the Blackfeet Reservation in Montana, sued the
ranch owner, a Blackfeet tribal member, and its insurance carrier in
Blackfeet Tribal Court. The insurance company moved the Tribal Court
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the Tribal
Court denied, holding that the tribe could regulate the conduct of
non-Indians engaged in commercial relations with Indians on the
reservation. 25 The Blackfeet Tribe has a Court of Appeals, but the
insurer could not obtain tribal appellate review until after trial on the
merits.
The insurer then filed suit in federal court under the diversity
statute. It sought a declaration that it was under no duty to defend or
indemnify its insured. Unlike the insurance company in National
Farmers Union, the insurer did not challenge the jurisdiction of the tribal
court under federal question jurisdiction; 2 6 rather, it sought a declaration
that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the ranch owner because
LaPlante's injuries fell outside its coverage. 2 7 The Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court decisions, holding that the insurance company
must exhaust available tribal remedies, including tribal appellate court
review. 28
29
Justice Marshall's opinion for the majority in Iowa Mutual
reflects the kind of analysis that has resulted in inflexible application of
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual in the lower courts. Justice
Marshall found in National Farmers Union a policy that "directs" a
federal court to stay its hand until the tribal court has determined its
jurisdiction. 30 Iowa Mutual found a federal policy against placing the
federal courts "in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby
impairing the latter's authority over reservation affairs."31 Finally, it
concludes that "[a]djudication of such matters by any nontribal court

24. National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
25. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 11-12.
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
26. See 480 U.S. at 20 (Stevens, J.,
insurer did not question the jurisdiction of the tribal court).
27. Id. at 13.
28. Id.at 19.
29. Id.at 20-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id.at 16.
31. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at16.
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also infringes upon tribal lawmaking authority, because tribal courts are
best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law."32
Iowa Mutual does declare in a footnote 33 that the rule it prescribes
"is analogous to principles of abstention articulated in Colorado River
Water Conservation District v. United States,"34 which sets flexible
35
standards to guide the abstention decision in federal cases generally.
While this reference might have borne the seed of a jurisprudence that
borrows from the federal courts' experience under the diversity statute,
there is little evidence that the lower courts have heeded such advice.
Justice Marshall's opinion makes clear, however, that the federal
36
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the diversity statute.
Ninth Circuit cases rejecting diversity jurisdiction over cases cognizable
in tribal court 37 were "[r]elegated to a dismissive footnote" 38 of Iowa
Mutual.3 9 Justice Marshall's majority opinion on the effect of the
diversity jurisdiction statute focuses on the seemingly uncontroversial
question whether the diversity statute divests tribal courts of jurisdiction,
concluding that it does not. 40 That statute, however, seems unhelpful
since, although the diversity jurisdiction does not "limit" state court
jurisdiction, it vests federal courts with concurrent jurisdiction over some
cases, and federal courts do not universally defer to state courts in all
such cases. 4 1 Iowa Mutual does not address federal cases defining
abstention standards to be applied in diversity cases, except for its
reference to "principles of abstention" recognized in Colorado River.4 2
Iowa Mutual also prescribed a procedure for federal court review of
tribal jurisdictional rulings that, while seemingly assured, can best be
described as narrow and cumbersome. "[A]t a minimum," federal
court review of questions decided by the tribal courts should await final
action by tribal appellate courts. 4 3 Then, if the tribal appeals court
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
35. See infra Part III.
36. See Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 17-19, 20-22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
37. See, e.g., R. J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir.
1986).
38. Brown & Desmond, supra note 23, at 259.
39. Iowa Mutual,480 U.S. at 20 n.13.
40. Id. at 17-18 (stating that Congress, in enacting and amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332, "has never
expressed any intent to limit the civil jurisdiction of the tribal courts.").
41. Compare Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228,238 (1943), and, Louisiana Power
& Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (refusing to abstain), with, County of
Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959); see generally, Note, Federal Court
Abstention in Diversity of Citizenship Cases, 62 S.CAL. L. REv. 1237 (1989).
42. See infra notes 62-68 (discussing ColoradoRiver abstention).
43. Iowa Mutual,480 U.S. at 17.
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affirms tribal court jurisdiction, "petitioner may challenge that ruling in
the District Court." 4 4 And, the resulting federal court review will be
limited to the jurisdictional issue, unless the federal court determines that
the tribal court lacked jurisdiction; in that instance, presumably, the
federal court plaintiff will start from scratch in federal court. 4 5
It is little wonder, then, that many lower courts have rigidly required
abstention in Indian cases, seemingly with little regard to the factors
which motivate abstention decisions in the off-reservation situation.
Following National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, the federal courts
have required abstention, unlike in National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual, where there was no ongoing tribal court dispute 4 6 and when
federal court jurisdiction was invoked by the sole Indian party in the
case.47 Similarly, exhaustion has been required even though all parties
could be joined in the federal court, but not in tribal court. 4 8 And,
exhaustion has been required although there were substantial proceedings in the federal court and significant delay before the motion to
abstain was filed.49 Finally, federal courts have required exhaustion in
disputes regarding tribal tax or regulatory power over non-Indian
activities on fee lands and areas largely opened to non-Indian settlement,
where, under Bourland,Brendale, and Montana, the existence of tribal
jurisdictional authority presents a federal question that is highly
fact-dependent.50 Cases such as these reflect that the federal courts have
interpreted National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual as laying down
rigid rules requiring abstention in almost all circumstances. Yet, the
holdings of National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual neither mandate

44. Id. at 19 (indicating by the Court's citation to National Farmers Union that review then will be
under federal question, not diversity, jurisdiction).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940 F.2d 1239, 1245 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Ci. 1992); Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., Inc., 947
F.2d 1405, 1407 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Whether proceedings are . . . pending in . . . tribal court is
irrelevant.").
47. Wellman v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
48. Middlemist v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 946 (D. Mont.
1993), affd, 19 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994).
49. See, e.g., Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 1096 (1992); United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768,770-71 (D.N.M. 1994).
50. See, e.g., Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 27
F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 (1995); see also, Pittsburg& Midway Mining Co.
v. Watchman, 1995 WL 231635 (10th Cir. April 19, 1995).
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all of these results, nor require ignoring the federal courts' decisions in
the abstention and Indian jurisdiction area.5 1
III. THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The federal courts' abstention doctrine is animated by two major
interests: limiting federal courts' intrusion upon important areas of state
policy and avoiding duplicative, often "reactive," litigation, pending
concurrently in state and federal court. The federal courts early held the
notion that "[tihe pendency of a prior suit in another jurisdiction is not
a bar [to a federal action] ... even though the two suits are for the same
cause of action." 5 2 Over time, the Supreme Court recognized exceptions to this rule that justified a federal court's decision to stay or dismiss
its case pending decisions in state proceedings. It has recognized four
classes of cases where specific state or federal interests supported staying
the federal action pending the resolution of state court proceedings.
Termed "Pullman," "Burford," "Younger," and "Colorado
River" abstention, each of the four prongs of the abstention doctrine
allows a federal court to stay its hand in circumstances shaped to deflect
a specific form of federal-state friction. Pullman and Burford abstention
focus on defusing federal-state conflict by allowing federal courts to
avoid unnecessary or intrusive resolution of unsettled issues of great
import to the state. In Pullman, this involved a federal constitutional
issue which might have been mooted by a state court's interpretation of
state law.5 3 Burford abstention applies in cases that would disrupt a
comprehensive state regulatory scheme 5 4 or that present difficult,
unresolved state law issues of substantial public import that transcend the
results in the specific case. 55
51. Cases declining to abstain exist. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Prairie Island
Mdewakanton Sioux Indian Community, 991 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1993); Altheimer & Gray v. Sioux Mfg.
Co., 983 F.2d 803 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 621 (1993); Burlington Northern R.R. v. Blackfeet
Tribe, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3013 (1992); Alaska v. Native Village of
Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384 (9th Cir. 1988); Lower Brule Constr. Co. v. Sheesley's Plumbing & Heating Co.,
84 B.R. 638 (D.S.D. 1988).
52. Stanton v. Embrey, 93 (3 Otto) U.S. 548, 554 (1876); see ERWIN CHENMERNSKY, FEDERAL
JnumsDIcnoN 660-75 (1989). This article does not address specific statutory limitations on federal court
jurisdiction that require dismissal or abstention.
53. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
54. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315,334 (1943); Burford sanctioned dismissal of
an action that would inject the federal courts into management of Texas' comprehensive oil and gas
regulatory scheme.
55. A variant strain of the Burford doctrine, allowing a federal court to stay (not dismiss) to seek
state court resolution of an unsettled question of state law, such as whether state law empowered cities
to condemn utility property, is reflected in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
25, 30 (1959). Scholars debate whether Burford and Thibodaux should be considered separate
doctrines. See the thoughtful discussion of the abstention doctrine in James C. Rehnquist, Taking
Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STr. L. REv. 1079 (1994).
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Younger abstention may apply when the state's interest in smooth
functioning of its criminal justice system or its civil enforcement
machinery is threatened by a federal court action to enjoin pending state
criminal proceedings. 5 6 Originally limited to federal actions to enjoin
state criminal proceedings, the Younger doctrine expanded to allow
abstention when a federal declaratory judgment would affect pending
criminal proceedings 57 and to federal actions to enjoin state civil
enforcement proceedings. 5 8 Younger abstention is available, however,
only when state proceedings are pending.59
The fourth strand of the abstention doctrine was premised originally
on considerations of judicial economy found to justify federal court
abstention when concurrent cases were pending in certain matters
governed by state law.60 An early trend towards liberal federal court
abstention in duplicative litigation cases was sharply constrained,
however, by the Supreme Court's decisions in Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States 6 1 and Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital Co. v. Mercury Constr. Co.62 Colorado River and Moses H.
Cone reined in lower court discretion to abstain, concluding that federal
courts have a "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the
jurisdiction given them" 6 3 and cautioning that abstention is warranted
only in "exceptional circumstances" arising from real benefits the stay
will yield for concrete procedural or substantive interests.64 These cases
articulate five (or six) factors to be weighed in determining whether
"exceptional circumstances" are present to warrant staying a federal suit
65
due to the pendency of concurrent litigation in state court:
the relative progress of the federal and state court litigation; the
importance of avoiding piecemeal litigation; whether there is a
congressionally declared policy that would be served by
56. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
57. See Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
58. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
59. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,462 (1974); accord, Ankenbrant v. Richards, 112 S.
Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992).
60. See, eg., Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491,495 (1942).
61. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
62. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
63. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817; see also Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 13-16.
64. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813, 818; Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 25-26 ('The task is to
ascertain whether there exist 'exceptional' circumstances, the 'clearest of justifications,' that can
suffice under Colorado River to justify the surrender of that jurisdiction.").
65. The federal courts have generally agreed in the non-Indian context that Colorado River
abstention is proper only if there are pending state court proceedings that are truly duplicative of the
federal ones, where the same parties are litigating the same issues in both forums. See, e.g., Crawley
v. Hamilton County Commr's, 744 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding abstention inappropriate because
there were not parallel state court proceedings); Bankers Trust Co. v. Chatterjee, 636 F.2d 37, 41 (3d
Cir. 1980) (finding that since proceedings were not truly duplicative, neither could be avoided).
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abstention; the relative inconvenience of the federal court to
the parties; and whether there is a federal question being
66
litigated.
The Colorado River factors have also been applied to actions
brought in federal court by tribes.67 There is no "tribal exception" to
Colorado River.
IV. THE ABSTENTION DOCTRINE AND TRIBAL COURTS:
HARMONIZING NATIONAL FARMERS UNION AND IOWA
MUTUAL WITH YOUNGER AND COLORADO RIVER
The lower courts' difficulty in discerning distinctions that take into
account the interests of litigants and the needs of a truly federal dispute
resolution system arises, in my view, from the failure of National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual to articulate adequately the analysis
that I find embedded in the two decisions. Put simply, the Supreme
Court wrote large the Indian law and policy considerations underlying its
decisions and left obscure, but still decipherable, its federal jurisdiction
premises.
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual reflect a doctrine woven
not only from the fabric of federal Indian law, but also from strands of
the abstention doctrine. While little recognized as such, the two cases
seem clearly to be offspring of the Younger and Colorado River prongs
of the abstention doctrine, respectively. In both National Farmers Union
and Iowa Mutual, the tribal court plaintiffs filed first, and the federal
action was filed in reaction to the tribal court filings. Consequently, in
each case, there was a tribal court proceeding pending at the time the
federal district court addressed the question whether to abstain in light of
the concurrent jurisdiction of the tribal and federal courts. But there
were differences between the two cases that would require different
treatment under the abstention doctrine, and National Farmers Union
and Iowa Mutual appear to recognize and give meaning to those
differences.
A.

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION AS A YOUNGER ABSTENTION CASE

The federal court plaintiff in National Farmers Union joined tribal
officials and sought to enjoin both the proceedings in tribal court and
the enforcement of its default judgment. This attempt to employ the
66. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, at 669; see ColoradoRiver, 424 U.S. at 818; Moses H. Cone, 460
U.S. at 23 (finding that existence of a federal question weighs heavily against abstention); Moses H.
Cone articulates a sixth factor, the adequacy of the forums to protect the parties' rights. 460 U.S. at 23.
67. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545,566-67 (1983).
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federal court as a shield against official conduct of a sovereign falls
within the Younger line of cases. 6 8 The Supreme Court's invocation of
the Younger doctrine is reflected, albeit subtly, by National Farmers
Union's citation at a critical juncture to Juidice v. Vail.69 Juidice v. Vail
was a significant first application of Younger in a non-criminal
proceeding; the federal court abstained in an action to enjoin a state civil
contempt proceeding initiated on behalf of a private creditor against a
debtor, one of the federal court plaintiffs, by the federal court defendant,
a justice of New York county court. 70 The three circumstances which
National Farmers Union's footnote 21 holds would excuse exhaustion
of tribal remedies (bad faith jurisdictional assertions, express jurisdictional prohibitions, and inadequate opportunities to challenge jurisdiction) are reviewed and found absent in the state proceedings in Juidice v.
Vail.7 1
Juidice seems, in many ways, a fitting analogy to National Farmers
Union. It applied Younger in a civil setting, and both federal court
plaintiffs sought relief from state judicial proceedings. However, in
Juidice and Younger v. Harris, and in the Younger lines of cases
generally, the state court proceeding sought to be enjoined in federal
court characteristically was initiated by state officials. 7 2 Even so,
National Farmers Union closely paralleled Juidice because the federal
court plaintiff in National Farmers Union sought to enjoin enforcement
of a Crow Tribal Court judgment and named as defendants in federal
court the Crow Tribe, its Tribal Council, the Tribal Court, judges of the
court and the chairman of the Tribal Council. 73 The Supreme Court has

68. See supra Part III.
69. 430 U.S. 327,338 (1977) (citing National FarmersUnion, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985)).
70. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327,329,335-36 (1977).
71. Id. at 337-38 (quoting Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975)). Professor Skibine has
argued, correctly, that the three exceptions to abstention recognized in NationalFarmers Union's
footnote 21 are 'similar in spirit" to those applied in administrative law exhaustion cases. Skibine,
supra note 10, at 205. However, the Supreme Court's direct citation to Juidice v. Vail and the near
identity of the exceptions recognized in NationalFarmers Union footnote 21 and the page it cites in
Juidice suggest that Younger, not administrative law, underlies NationalFarmers Union's abstention
requirement. Note that Juidice addressed "express constitutional prohibitions," rather than the
"express jurisdictional prohiitions," which were the focus of National FarmersUnion.
72. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (involving an action to enjoin state criminal
prosecution); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 455 (1974) (involving an action for declaratory
judgment against state officials and private parties). Younger abstention cases often have arisen in the
context of actions against state officials acting "under color of state law,' sought to be enjoined under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, with federal court jurisdiction premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).
73. See National FarmersUnion, 471 U.S. at 848.
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since extended Younger to actions to enjoin collection of a state court
judgment, and a sizable one at that.74
B.

IowA MUTUAL AS A COLORADO RIVER ABSTENTION CASE

Iowa Mutual, by a similar analysis, is revealed to be a liberal
application of Colorado River abstention. Since no tribal officials were
prosecuting criminal actions or instituting civil enforcement mechanisms
against the insurance company in Iowa Mutual, Younger abstention
would not apply. Before federal jurisdiction was invoked, three private
parties were litigating a private dispute in tribal court. However, the
pendency of proceedings in tribal court at the time of LaPlante's motion
75
to dismiss required the motion to be treated under Colorado River.
This conclusion is reinforced because Iowa Mutual's only citation to
"federal jurisdiction" case law outside the Indian law area is its
recognition that:
Exhaustion is required as a matter of comity, not as a
jurisdictional prerequisite. In this respect, the rule is analogous
to principles of abstention articulated in Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976): even
where there is concurrent jurisdiction in both the state and
federal courts, deference to state proceedings renders it
appropriate for the federal courts to decline jurisdiction in
certain circumstances.76
Although Iowa Mutual regrettably declined to define fully the
"certain circumstances" that support abstention, this reference to
Colorado River for guidance in future cases seems unmistakable. Iowa
Mutual confuses the matter by its reference earlier in the same footnote
to "the exhaustion rule enunciated in National Farmers Union . .. .".77
Although this suggests a unitary "exhaustion rule" applicable to
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual, the differences between the
cases and their citations to different authority refute the existence of
such a rule. Clearly, the exhaustion required in National Farmers Union
was not premised upon Colorado River, because it arose in a Younger
context and imported exceptions to its exhaustion requirement from
74. In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987), the Supreme Court majority held
that the district court should have abstained under the Younger doctrine, to require Texaco to assert its
constitutional objections to Pennzoil's $10 billion dollar judgment in Texas courts. Interestingly, the
Pennzoil majority, like National Farmers Union, placed substantial reliance on Juidice v. Vail. See
Anne Althouse, The Misguided Search For State Interest In Abstention Cases: Observationson the
Occasion of Pennzoil v. Texaco, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1051 (Nov. 1988).
75. See supra at notes 61-68.
76. 480 U.S. 9, 16 n.8 (1987).
77. Id.
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Younger jurisprudence. Iowa Mutual, by contrast, has the character of a
ColoradoRiver, not a Younger, case, and this is reinforced by its reliance
on, again in footnote 8, "Colorado River, [where] as here, strong federal
policy concerns favored resolution in the non-federal forum." 78 In
Iowa Mutual, the Supreme Court properly turned to Colorado River
rather than Younger abstention because the common law damage action
plainly did not implicate the interest in avoiding disruption of government enforcement machinery that animates the Younger doctrine.
Iowa Mutual, however, failed to touch all of the Colorado River
bases, 79 and that may have spawned confusion in the lower courts. Iowa
Mutual's discussion of the case certainly considers matters that implicate
Colorado River factors, such as inconvenience of the federal forum, the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, and the order in which
jurisdiction was obtained by the concurrent forums; however, Iowa
Mutual failed to clarify that it was addressing those factors by their
Colorado River handles. Similarly, Justice Marshall's decision in Iowa
Mutual does not reflect recognition that the "strong federal policy
concerns [that] favored resolution in the non-federal forum" it cites in
Colorado River expressly were found in that case to be material to its
abstention factor of "avoiding piecemeal litigation." 80 Nonetheless,
Iowa Mutual clearly is a Colorado River case.
C.

APPLYING YOUNGER AND COLORADO RIVER TO INDIAN COUNTRY

CASES

Significant differences would flow from correctly determining at
the onset whether a case raises Younger or Colorado River abstention
issues-or if neither is satisfied. First, both doctrines require in the first
instance, as was the case in National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual,
the pendency of concurrent actions in federal and tribal court. This
would alter the results in numerous cases. Second, different considerations apply under the two doctrines to determine whether the federal
court should proceed. In the Younger context, the exceptions in
footnote 21 of National Farmers Union, focusing on bad faith
harassment, express limitations on tribal court jurisdiction, and the
absence of a procedure to challenge tribal jurisdiction, are dispositive.
Colorado River abstention, by contrast, contemplates that federal courts
will retain a broader class of cases because concerns for disrupting tribal
78. 480 U.S. at 16 n.8 (citing Colorado River, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976)). The cited page of
Colorado River analyses one of the four factors it requires be considered in abstention decisions, 'the
desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation.'
79. See supra note 69.
80. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19.
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enforcement machinery are absent or reduced; hence, the six factors of
Colorado River and Moses H. Cone, focus on the interests of the parties
and the dispute resolution system reflected in the relative progress of the
federal and state court cases and convenience and comprehensiveness of
the adjudications. These fairness and efficiency interests must be
weighed to determine whether the interests of judicial administration
favor abstention or retention of federal court jurisdiction.
These distinctions are not merely formal: in the National Farmers
Union context, strong tribal interests counsel federal court caution
before enjoining a first-filed tribal court criminal or civil enforcement
action, or the enforcement of a tribal court judgment, absent the specific,
narrow exceptions of National Farmers Union's footnote 21. In the
Iowa Mutual situation, the primary considerations should be those of the
litigants and the efficient resolution of the dispute; the relatively weaker
tribal interests in requiring tribal members or non-Indian parties to
Indian country litigation to litigate private disputes in tribal court must
be weighed against the expense, inconvenience, or uncertainty to the
parties that the Colorado River factors are designed to avoid.
Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co.81 illustrates the effect of applying
the wrong rule. Crawford was a diversity jurisdiction personal injury
damage action filed by an injured Native American in state court. The
defendants removed the case from state to federal court. There was no
pending tribal court action and no tribal civil or criminal enforcement
proceeding. Consequently, Crawford should be analyzed under the
Iowa Mutual prong of the Indian absention doctrine.
The Native American plaintiff delayed until twenty-three days
before a trial setting to move to dismiss to require exhaustion of tribal
remedies; 8 2 the state/federal court case had been pending some five years
when the district court denied the motion to dismiss, based in part on the
delay in filing the motion.8 3 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding "we do
not perceive room in the Supreme Court's precedents for a decision not
to defer." 8 4 Ignoring the flexible factors of Colorado River that
expressly consider delay in one forum, the Ninth Circuit found
conclusive the absence of the three Younger factors articulated in
National Farmers Union.85
If Colorado River guides abstention decisions in Indian country
diversity cases under Iowa Mutual, Crawford is plainly wrong. It is
*81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

947 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991).
947 F.2d at 1407.
Id.
Id. at 1408.
Id.
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erroneous under Colorado River on two grounds: there was no pending
tribal court proceeding, and the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked
discretion to consider factors that are clearly pertinent under Colorado
River. Crawford seems to present no tribal interest significant enough to
compel abstention given the obvious prejudice to the non-Indian
defendant and the waste of the federal judge's efforts over several years.
While tribal courts may have interests in handling such cases, their
interests should not automatically trump those of all other participants in
such cases.
D. "COMITY" IS A Two-WAY STREET
The Younger and Colorado River underpinnings of National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual are reflected in Iowa Mutual's
emphasis upon the notion of "comity" to guide exhaustion decisions.
While the term does not appear in National Farmers Union, Iowa Mutual
describes the National Farmers Union holding as resting upon the
conclusion that "considerations of comity direct that Tribal remedies be
exhausted before the question is addressed by the District Court." 8 6
"Comity" arose in the abstention jargon in Younger v. Harris, which
described the concept as two-edged, embodying a "proper respect for
state functions," but no
blind deference to 'state's rights' any more than it means
centralization of control over every important issue in our
National Government and its courts. The Framers rejected
both these courses. What the concept does represent is a
system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of
both State and National Governments .... 87
The "comity" concept contemplates a jurisprudence that identifies
the interests of competing sovereigns and seeks a resolution that
harmonizes legitimate interest of all concerned governments in the
controversy. Nonetheless, these conclusions about National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual reflect the contours of a two-pronged doctrine.
Each of the four abstention strains reflects the balancing of specific state
interests against the interest of the federal court plaintiff in its choice of
forum; states, like tribes, are sovereigns, and, although the interests of
tribes and states in judicial power over such controversies are different,
86. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 15 (citing National Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857). See also 480
U.S. at 16 n.8 ("exhaustion is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional prerequisite.").
87. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); see Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously, 46 STAN.
L. REV. at 1086 ('the watch word is not deference to one forum, but sensitivity to both."); see also,
Phillip W. Lear and Blake D. Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Court Remedies: Rejecting Bright-Line
Rules and Affirmative Action, 71 N.D. L. REv. 277 (1995)
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they seem of comparable weight. Younger and Colorado River
abstentions both require the existence of a presently pending state court
proceeding and then condition abstention on determinations that the
state court proceeding be a fair and adequate one. These abstention
doctrines suggest a two-pronged rule for use in Indian abstention cases:
there must be a pending tribal court proceeding, and, in most cases
Younger or Colorado River abstention factors. In the absence of
pending tribal court or administrative proceedings, there would have to
be specific tribal regulatory interests or difficult unresolved issues of
tribal law to justify abstention under Pullman or Burford.
V.

TRIBAL VS. OTHER COURTS' POWERS OVER DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A.

THE

STATE COURTS AND THE TRIBAL COURTS

There remains the argument that tribal courts have unique
exclusivity of jurisdiction supporting "automatic" exhaustion. A review
of modem authority reflects that, while tribal courts enjoy a powerful
priority over state courts, federal courts have traditionally served as
arbiters of the status of tribes, except where congressional interests
expressly limited their jurisdiction.
Non-Indians' experience with tribal courts, generally, is a recent
one, and the first modem Supreme Court decisions to define the role of
tribal courts arose in conflicts between tribal courts and state courts. The
1959 Supreme Court decision in Williams v. Lee8 8 is the watershed. A
non-Indian owner of a federally licensed trading post on the Navajo
reservation sued to collect a debt owed by a Navajo living on the
reservation arising from a transaction at the on-reservation trading post.
Williams held that an Arizona state district court lacked jurisdiction, and
that the action must proceed in Navajo tribal court.
Williams discerned a central question that framed the Supreme
Court's determinations concerning the jurisdiction of state versus tribal
courts: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the right of
reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. 8 9 "
That influential phrase has shaped the cases that subsequently have
defined the balance of judicial power, and has underlain the recognition
of other powers in Indian country.

88. 88.358 US. 217 (1959).
89. 358 U.S. at 220.
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What is most remarkable about Williams v. Lee is its holding that
only the tribal court had jurisdiction over the action, despite the fact that
the state court plaintiff had served a summons on the Navajo defendant
when the debtor had been off the reservation. 90 Ordinarily, a state court
has subject matter jurisdiction over transitory "actions, like the action in
Williams on a debt arguably occurring outside Arizona's borders," and
the state court's power to proceed depends on personal jurisdiction over
non-resistant parties. 9 1 While Williams v. Lee has been described as
declaring that tribal court jurisdiction over on-reservation controversies
is "exclusive," 92 it addressed only state and tribal claims to jurisdiction
over the collection action, and it emphasized that "no Federal Act has
given state courts jurisdiction over such controversies." 93
Williams v. Lee reflects, however, that the jurisdiction it found was
not grounded in territorial hegemony. It recognized that state courts
"have been allowed to try non-Indians who committed crimes against
each other on a reservation." 9 4 Williams also observed that state court
may entertain suits by Indians against outsiders. 9 5 While Williams v. Lee
invested tribes with important new dispute resolution powers, its
recognition of state power over- such on-reservation controversies
clarifies that it is founded both in geography, the on-reservation situs of
the transaction and parties, and in tribal affiliation,96 including the tribal
membership of the defendant. 97
Further reflecting the Court's balance between tribal and other
courts are the Supreme Court's decisions in two cases, both named Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering,

90. 358 U.S.at 218.
91. See Fred L. Ragsdale, Jr., The Deception of Geography in AMERICAN INDIAN PoUCY iN THE
20TH CENTURY 72 (Vine DeLoria, Jr. ed. 1985):
In the Williams case, there was personal jurisdiction because both parties were before the court.
The holding was that the Arizona court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, however. In other words,
that court could not hear this kind of case. If the same facts had happened in London, England, the
same people, the same debt, and identical service of the summons, then unquestionably Arizona would
have had subject matter jurisdiction.
92. See CHARLEs F. WKINsON, AMECAN INDIANs, TimE, AND THE LAW at 1-3 (1987).
93. 358 U.S. at 222. It appears that the citizenship of the parties could not support federal court
in diversity jurisdiction.
94. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220 (citing People of State of New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S.
496 (1946).
95. Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (citing Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317 (1892)).
96. See Ragsdale, The Deception of Geographysupra note 91, at 71 n.16.
97. Cases following Williams v. Lee which find tribal court primacy over state courts generally
are consistent with Williams v. Lee. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971), found a tribal
council resolution which purported to give tribal court and state court concurrent jurisdiction over suits
against tribal members ineffective to establish jurisdiction in Montana state court over an action to
collect an on-reservation debt against tribal members. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-90
(1976), held that Montana courts lack jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding in which all parties
were members of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe and residents of its Reservation.
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P.C.98 Both Wold cases rejected state courts' efforts to decline subject
matter jurisdiction over an action filed by a tribe in state court against
non-Indians arising from on-reservation dealings, at least when the tribal
court did not have jurisdiction over such a claim. 99 The Supreme
Court's decision in Wold II went further, holding that North Dakota
could not condition access to its courts on a tribe's waiving its immunity
from suit. 10 0 The Wold cases, consequently, obligate state courts to
assume and decide cases involving tribes, at least when necessary to an
efficient and complete resolution of the controversy. While these cases
reflect a tribal court primacy over state courts, they reflect at least a
privilege in some circumstances for Indian plaintiffs to use state courts.
This suggests that tribal court jurisdiction, even as against state courts,
generally is not mandatory.
B.

THE FEDERAL COURTS VS. THE TRIBAL COURT

The federal courts have played a central role in resolving disputes
within Indian country and in shaping the contours of tribal sovereignty.
Federal question jurisdictionl01 has served traditionally as the major
vehicle resolving disputes concerning the status of the tribes, the scope of
their power, and the applicability of federal law to them. Federal
question jurisdiction was a broader font of judicial power within Indian
country than elsewhere, because tribal governmental and possessory
rights intrinsically were created and defined by federal law.10 2 The
Oneida cases reflect the federal court's vigorous use of the federal
question jurisdiction in Indian law cases in the 1960s and 1970s.
Although the Supreme Court yielded federal court jurisdiction to
tribal courts in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, it did so under a specific
federal statute. 10 3 The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968104 had subjected
98. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S.
138 (1984) [hereinafter Wold I]; and Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Engineering, P.C., 476 U.S. 877 (1986) [hereinafter Wold 11].
99. See 467 U.S. at 148-51; 476 U.S. at 883.
100. 476 U.S. at 889. The Wold lI court also found material that 'the tribe has no other effective
means of securing relief for civil wrongs," including the potential need for state court enforcement.
Id.
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988); U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; a specific statute makes clear that the
federal courts have jurisdiction over actions by any "Indian tribe or band with a governing body duly
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior' to bring federal question actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(1988); see generally, F. CoHEN HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW at 311-12 (1982).
102. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661,670 (1974) (possessory
action by tribe presents federal question because "Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be
extinguished only with federal consent.'); see also Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 284 (1985) ('[wjith the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive
province of federal law.').
103. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
104. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-03 (1988).
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Indian tribes, for the first time, to constitution-like duties similar to those
applicable to state or federal governments. The ICRA did not, however,
expressly provide for federal court jurisdiction over actions arising
under the statute, and Santa Clara Pueblo determined that no implied
right of action existed to enforce the ICRA. Federal court review of
tribal governmental actions would, the Court concluded, interfere with
"tribal autonomy and self-government beyond that created by the
change in substantive law itself' and may "undermine the authority of
the tribal court." 105 This the Court found impermissible under Williams
v. Lee, because it would "infringe on the right of the Indians to govern
themselves." 10 6 While Santa Clara Pueblo clearly sent ICRA plaintiffs
to tribal court, it left intact federal question10 7 and diversity jurisdiction
over actions on Indian land. 10 8
C.

ABSTENTION IN FEDERAL QUESTION CASES IN INDIAN COUNTRY

The factor recognized under the Colorado River doctrine by Moses
H. Cone, that is, the extent to which federal question jurisdiction
underlies a controversy,1 09 may weigh heavily against abstention in
Indian cases. Federal decision of federal question cases has long been
regarded as instrumental to obtain the benefits of federal court
experience in "federal specialties,"1 0 and because of "the importance,
and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole
United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the consti
tution."ll In 1824, Chief Justice Marshall described Supreme Court
review of federal issues on appeal from a state court after the case has
been shaped by fact findings of an unsympathetic state court, as an
"insecure remedy" for federal rights.11 2 Consequently, federal courts
105. 436 U.S. at 59.
106. Id. The Court also found the express provision of an habeas corpus remedy, and the failure
of the ICRA to mention other remedies, reflected the intention that only habeas corpus relief for ICRA
violates be available in federal court. Id. at 65.
107. National Farmers Union's holding affirms that federal question exists in an action to test
tribal court jurisdiction.
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) (following Williams v. Lee, there was a split in the circuits over
whether diversity jurisdiction over actions involving Indians on reservations was barred because the
exercise of jurisdiction would interfere with tribal self-government). Compare Hot Oil Service, Inc. v.
Hall, 366 F.2d 295, 297 (9th Cir. 1966) (exercise of diversity jurisdiction barred) with Poitra v.
DeMarrias, 502 F.2d 23 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 934 (1975); see supra note 37.
109. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23.
110. ALI Study on the Division of Jurisdiction, Commentary on federal question jurisdiction at 70;
Indian law easily fits the class of cases that includes bankruptcy, patent, and federal anti-trust.
111.Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-48 (1816); Professor Clinton, however, has
argued that the independence of the federal judges and effectually the Supremacy Clause
vouch-safed by life tenure and related Constitutional protections primarily motivated federal court
review of federal questions. See Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Early Implementation of and
Departures From the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLuM. L. REv. 1515, 1542 (1986).
112. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738, 822 (1824).
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have felt the need to retain federal question jurisdiction to protect federal
rights, despite the fact that such cases usually also involve state law issues
and impact state policies."l 3 Additionally, federal review of federal
questions at some appropriate stage arguably is constitutionally
mandated by Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, which requires that
"The judicial Power [of the United States] shall extend to all Cases in
Law and Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties.""14 In the highly fact-dependent jurisdiction
controversies framed by recent Supreme Court case law which allocate
regulatory jurisdiction and other powers between tribes and states, 1 15 the
power to find the facts may decide the law. Important legitimacy
interests may favor having the relatively disinterested federal forums
decide those cases. Courts applying the Indian abstention doctrine
should consider the significant, if not dispositive, role that initial federal
review of facts may have in federal question cases. These federal
interests in allocating power in Indian country are reflected in recent
cases that refuse to abstain in cases brought by tribes to enjoin state
officials. In Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roachel' 6 and Fort
Belknap Indian Community v. Mazurek,"l7 the federal courts refused to
require exhaustion of remedies and exercised federal question
jurisdiction, concluding that "the jurisdictional issue is paramount and
federal..."118 In a similar setting, the federal courts have employed a
procedure that allows a tribe's federal claims to be decided in federal
court after state law claims are decided in state proceedings."l 9 The same
regard should be given to the federal interest in resolving federal
questions when the contest is between state and tribal courts.
Federal question jurisdiction is implicated directly in cases brought
under federal Indian policies. This is reflected in developing Supreme
Court jurisprudence which parses regulatory jurisdiction among states
and tribes based upon landholding and demographic patterns.1 20 Those
113. See England v. Louisiana Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,416-17 (1964) (review of
state court decision by the Supreme Court is "an inadequate substitute" for an initial determination by a
federal district court. How the facts are found will often dictate the decision of federal claims.')
114. See generally, Clinton, Mandatory Federal Court Jurisdiction, 86 COLUM. L. REV. at
1541-43.
115. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408,423-24 (1989); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.
Ct. 2309 (1993).
116. 38 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1994).
117. 43 F.3d 428,431-32 9th Cir. 1994).
118. Belknap Indian Community v. Mazurek, 43 F.3d 428,432 (9th Cir, 1994).
119. ConfederatedSalish and Kootenai Tribes v. Simonich, 29 F.3d 1398, 1406 (9th Cir. 1994).
120. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 423-24 (1989); see also South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S.
Ct. 2309 (1993).
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cases reflect that tribal powers depend substantially on the extent to
which tribal property and members are affected. The recent decisions
applying the abstention doctrine, by contrast, generally disregard such
factors. 12 1 These seemingly irreconcilable lines of cases result in vesting
tribes with power to resolve disputes regarding lands over which they
may lack power to regulate and, consequently, may dramatically affect
the outcomes of the heavily fact-dependent jurisdictional controversies
framed by Montana and Brendale. In these cases, the federal courts
have dismissed federal question actions, even though parallel proceedings were not pending in tribal courts. Younger and Colorado River
doctrines would counsel exercise of the federal question jurisdiction
unless countervailing tribal policies protected under Pullman or Burford
abstention were present.122
D.

ABSTENTION IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION CASES IN INDIAN COUNTRY

The policies underlying federal courts' diversity jurisdiction
address concerns prevalent in jurisdictional disputes in Indian country.
Regarding diversity jurisdiction, Justice Story wrote "[t]he constitution
has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not inquire) that state
attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies and state interests, might
sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the
regular administration of justice."1 2 3 The drafters of the diversity
statutes also feared elected judges or legislative review: "Not unnaturally,
the commercial interests of the country were reluctant to expose
themselves to the hazards of litigation before such courts as these."1 24
While the premises of diversity jurisdiction are questioned contemporarily,1 2 5 and the threshold amount in controversy recently raised,1 26 the

121. See, e.g., Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 27
F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 (1995); United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768
(D.N.M. 1994); see also Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374 (10th Cir. 1993), decision on remand, U.S.L.W. (D.N.M. Jan. 30, 1995); Pittsburg & Midway Mining Co. v. Watchman, 1995 U.S.L.W.
231635 (10th Cir. April 19, 1995).
122. Pullman could justify abstention if resolution of a difficult and unsettled issue of tribal law
could moot a federal constitutional issue; Burford could justify abstntion if federal court intervention
would seriously disrupt functioning of tribal administrative machinery in an area of important tribal
policy. See supra, Part I1.
123. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat. 304, 347 (1816).
124. See Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483,
498 (1928); see also Frank, Historical Bases of the FederalJudicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 22-28 (1948)(among two other reasons, "the desire to avoid regional prejudice against
commercial litigants.. ."); P. Bator, ET AL, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1051-53 (1973).

125. See Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the FederalJudicial Code, 13 LAW
& CoNrEMP. PRoBS. 216, 234-40 (1948).
126. See Act of Nov. 19, 1988. Pub. L. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4646, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) to
require amount in controversy of $50,000.
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policy remains, grounded in the federal Constitution, Article III, section
2 and the federal Judicial Code. 12 7
The proper functioning of the abstention doctrine in Indian country
diversity cases is not fully articulated in Iowa Mutual. The federal courts
generally have resisted requests to abstain in diversity cases; the doctrine
seems to serve no purpose in a contest between federal and state courts
because the removal statute1 2 8 reflects a policy that any case cognizable
under the diversity statute may be heard at the option of the defendant in
federal court. 129 The Supreme Court recognized in Iowa Mutual that
diversity jurisdiction may exist in on-reservation disputes, but it declined
to address the weight that federal courts should give to the concerns of
the diversity statute to even the playing field by neutralizing the possible
effect of local bias by tribal courts against outsiders. This concern often
motivates diversity filings in the Indian country context and the policies
underlying the diversity statute compels the federal courts to weigh this
factor in an abstention decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
A proper doctrine allocating judicial power between tribal and
federal courts would require a federal court to take into account interests
that are lost in the analysis of recent cases. Applying the abstention
doctrine developed in the federal/state context would be a first step
towards a jurisprudence that considers the interests of all parties to
current cases and the needs of the dispute resolution system.

127. See also Clinton, Mandatory Federal Jurisdition, 86 Colum. L. Rev. at 1548, 1583.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
129. An influential early study concluded that, in diversity cases, "the disadvantages of abstention
outweigh any conceivable gain in requiring state determination of state questions in routine diversity
suits between private litigants involving no issue of public law." AMERICAN LAW INSTmrrE, STrDY (N
TE FEDERAL JURISDicntoN at 218 (citing Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943)).

